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I. INTRODUCTION
A previous Texas Survey article categorized Texas's health care
laws as "adding to the patchwork of new legal considerations
that the health care industry must track and manage." 1 The
cases decided during this Survey period do nothing to contradict that cat-
egorization in that they address a variety of legal issues. However, 2010 is
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1. Tara Kepler et al., Health Care Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2009).
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particularly noteworthy with respect to health care laws because of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("PPACA"), which is
arguably one of the most important laws affecting health care providers
passed in recent years.2 Although the fate of PPACA is unclear as of this
date, the mere fact of its passage and the implementation of a number of
its provisions certainly suggests that the United States may be ready to
begin developing a coordinated health care program, which will undoubt-
edly require a response by the Texas Legislature.
Texas health care providers are affected both directly and indirectly by
changes in federal health care laws. They are affected directly because
many federal laws expressly determine how Texas health care providers
and suppliers conduct their business and are paid for services.3 They are
indirectly affected because Texas laws often mirror their federal counter-
parts.4 PPACA has already had and, in the event it is fully implemented,
will continue to have an impact on the manner in which health care prov-
iders, legislators, and even the courts respond to, implement, and inter-
pret the myriad of Texas laws that affect health care providers.5
II. COMPETITION, RESTRAINT OF TRADE, AND OTHER
BUSINESS RESTRICTIONS
This section reviews cases that limit, restrict, or protect a health care
provider's right to conduct business. In the event the federal government
continues to develop initiatives such as the accountable care organization
and the medical home, then some, if not all of these laws, are likely to
affect how Texas health care providers participate in such initiatives.
A. NONCOMPETES APPLIED TO OWNERSHIP INTERESTS OF PHYSICIANS
IN SURGICAL CENTERS
Texas takes the position that restraints on business do little to en-
courage a healthy business climate and, as such, sets specific require-
ments that must be met for a covenant not to compete to be enforceable. 6
Section 15.50(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code establishes
additional elements that must be in place for a covenant not to compete
to be enforceable against a physician, including a requirement that any
2. See About the Affordable Care Act, HEALTH.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/
about/index.htmI (last visited May 17, 2011).
3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006) (restricting how and under what circumstances
physicians can refer Medicare patients to entities with which the physician has a financial
relationship).
4. See, e.g., Id. § 1320a-7b(b) (the federal anti-kickback law); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN.
§§ 102.001-054 (West 2011) (the state counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
5. See supra note 2.
6. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2011) ("[A] covenant not to
compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agreement at
the time the agreement is made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geo-
graphical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose




covenant not to compete applied against a physician includes a buyout
provision.7 Greenville Surgery Center, Ltd. v. Beebe tests the applicability
of this rule to physicians who purchase ownership interests in an outpa-
tient surgical center.8
Greenville Surgery Center (Center) was an outpatient surgical center
specializing in ophthalmic surgeries. The Center was formed as a limited
partnership with seventeen physician limited partners. 9 The partnership
agreement included a noncompete provision that prohibited the limited
partners (or certain family members) from owning an interest in, manag-
ing, leasing, or otherwise having a financial interest in a competing facility
within a ten-mile radius of the Center. The agreement did not include a
provision permitting the physicians to buyout the noncompete. 10
Nine of the Center's physician owners decided to develop a new facility
located 1.5 miles from the Center. The physicians intended to maintain
their ownership interest in the Center while the new facility was devel-
oped. The Center requested an ownership interest in the new facility, but
when refused, it informed the physicians that they were in violation of the
partnership agreement's covenant not to compete. 1 The doctors filed a
declaratory action to have the covenant declared unenforceable. Eventu-
ally, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, with the trial court
granting the physicians' motion. The Center appealed on the breach of
contract claim and took the position that section 15.50(b)(2) did not ap-
ply to this noncompete because the restriction did not limit the physi-
cians' ability to practice medicine. 12
The key factor in deciding this case was the Dallas Court of Appeal's
finding that the section 15.50(b)(2) buyout requirement was not limited
to situations in which the parties enforcing the noncompete wished to
limit a physician's practice of medicine. 13 The court of appeals declined
to narrowly interpret the language of section 15.50(b)(2) as applying only
to physicians' practice of medicine and, as such, found that the covenant
not to compete was unenforceable because it did not include a buyout
provision.14
This conclusion is not surprising given the plain language of the statute,
but it also illustrates a relatively new application of physician noncom-
petes that indirectly involve a physician's practice of medicine. It is not
7. Id. at § 15.50(b) (requiring any covenant not to compete applicable to a licensed
physician to (i) allow the physician access to a list of patients he has treated within the past
year, (ii) provide the physicians with access to copies of their medical records, (iii) include
a buyout provision that releases the physician from the noncompete for an agreed to price,
and (iv) not prohibit the physician from providing care to patients requiring continued care
during the course of an illness or injury following termination).
8. Greenville Surgery Ctr., Ltd. v. Beebe, 320 S.W.3d 850, 851 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2010, no pet.).
9. Id. at 850.
10. See id. at 851.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 851-53.




unusual for health care facilities to specifically target physicians who have
the ability to refer patients to their facilities when seeking out investors. 15
This practice is most frequently seen in hospitals and surgical centers,
such as the one described in Greenville, where the physicians are permit-
ted by the federal Stark law to refer patients to facilities in which they
hold an ownership interest. 16 It is specifically because these physician
owners have the ability to refer patients to the hospital or surgical center
that these facilities seek out physician investors. The physicians' ability to
contribute capital to the business venture is often a secondary reason for
seeking their investment. 17
In an effort to encourage these owner physicians to refer most, if not
all, of their patients to the facility in which they hold an ownership inter-
est, the operators of these facilities frequently include noncompete cove-
nants in the partnership or subscriber agreements that prohibit owner
physicians from holding an ownership interest in a facility located within
the facility's geographic catchment area.' 8 As illustrated by Greenville,
such noncompetes are not enforceable unless they include all the require-
ments set forth in section 15.50(b).' 9
B. ANTITRUST TO REMEDY PEER REVIEW AND
CREDENTIALING DISPUTES
Marlin v. Robertson is a creative case that overlays the more typical
medical staff credentialing or peer review dispute with allegations that
three hospitals unlawfully worked together to drive two neurosurgeons
out of the area.20 In Marlin, the physicians blamed their failure to secure
privileges at two hospitals not on the medical staff's denial of due process,
but instead on a conspiracy engaged in by three area hospitals to force
them out of the community. These claims, had they been true, would
have required a concerted effort by three unrelated hospitals or hospital
systems, working with their respective medical staffs, to drive two physi-
cians out of the community, allegedly so that the hospitals could replace
the offending physicians with others that the hospitals could better con-
trol. The San Antonio Court of Appeals rightly decided that the hospi-
tals' actions were not a violation of the Texas Free Enterprise and
Antitrust Act. 21
Dr. Marlin and Dr. Gaskill were pediatric neurosurgeons (collectively,
the Physicians) on staff at Methodist Healthcare System of San Antonio
15. See id. at 850-51.
16. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
17. See Greenville, 320 S.W.3d at 850-51.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (the federal Stark law); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (the fed-
eral anti-kickback statute that, like the Stark law, strictly governs arrangements whereby
physician owners are permitted to refer patients to health care facilities).
19. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(b) (West 2011)
20. Marlin v. Robertson, 307 S.W.3d 418, 423-24 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no
pet.).
21. Id. at 431-32; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05(b).
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(MHS). 22 In 2003, the Physicians began moving their practices to North
Central Baptist Hospital (North Central). Shortly thereafter, Marlin took
a leave of absence from membership on the MHS medical staff, and Gas-
kill resigned her privileges at MHS. The Physicians had also obtained
and then resigned (in 2000 and 2001, respectively) their privileges at
Christus Santa Rosa Health Care (Christus), a third hospital in the area.
In 2004, Marlin reapplied for privileges at MHS, and both of the Physi-
cians reapplied for privileges at Christus. However, before either hospi-
tal finalized their applications, both of the Physicians withdrew their
applications out of fear that they would be denied, which would require a
report by each of the hospitals to the National Practitioners Data Bank. 23
Shortly thereafter, the Physicians closed their practices at North Central
and left the area to practice in another state.24
Claiming violations of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act, the
Physicians eventually brought suit against all of the hospitals. They also
brought a separate breach of contract claim against MHS and alleged it
engaged in "malicious and sham peer review," which violated their right
of due process. 25 The defendant hospitals filed for summary judgment
and brought counterclaims for costs and attorney's fees. The trial court
ordered the plaintiffs take nothing on their claims and denied the defen-
dant hospitals their counterclaims. Both parties appealed. 26
With respect to the antitrust claims, the Physicians alleged that the hos-
pitals engaged in a concerted boycott by instructing their respective
emergency department physicians to not refer to the Physicians and
thereby preventing the Physicians from practicing; and by not informing
patients where they could find the Physicians. 27 The Physicians also
claimed that "they were driven from the 'market' by an 'improper' use of
the peer review process. '"28 The court of appeals analyzed the Physicians'
claims under the rule of reason, in part "because courts have generally
been reluctant to 'hold that a group of physicians who decide that they do
not want to refer patients to a particular surgeon, . . . have committed a
per se violation of the Sherman Act."' 29
The Physicians claimed that the hospitals benefitted economically from
driving them from the market by replacing the Physicians with others
they "could more easily control."'30 They also claimed that the market
22. Marlin, 307 S.W.3d at 423.
23. See generally The Data Bank-Reporting Compliance Background, HSS.Gov, http:/
/www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/news/reportingComplianceBackground.jsp (last visited May 10,
2011) (requiring designated health care facilities to report certain adverse actions taken
against licensed physicians, including, by not limited, to denial or loss of medical staff
privileges).
24. Marlin, 307 S.W.3d at 423.
25. Id. at 424.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 427-28.
28. Id. at 429.
29. Id. (quoting Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1370 (W.D. Pa. 1982)).
30. Id. at 430.
2011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
suffered from the loss of the Physicians' expertise through a decrease in
quality of care and negative impact on patient care and choice.31 The
court of appeals court rejected the Physicians' arguments after finding
that they offered no evidence to support their claims that the market suf-
fered as a result of the loss of their services and that the cost of such
services in the market did not increase. 32 With respect to the Physicians'
claim that the other physicians in the community, through the actions of
the hospitals, were trying to create a monopoly, the court of appeals con-
cluded that none of the hospitals had the power to monopolize the
market.33
The court of appeals also rejected the Physicians' breach of contract
claim against MHS. 34 The Physicians argued that MHS breached its con-
tractual obligation to the Physicians both when Marlin attempted to reap-
ply for privileges and when MHS treated Gaskill inappropriately during
the peer review process prior to the time she resigned from the medical
staff.35 Their argument was somewhat convoluted, but it was based on
prior findings that a hospital's medical staff bylaws can create a contract
between the medical staff and the member physicians-especially with
respect to physician members' rights to due process in the credentialing
and peer review actions of the medical staff.36 However, in Marlin, the
Physicians did not claim that the medical staff breached its contract with
the Physicians. Instead, the Physicians claimed that MHS-through the
relationship between the MHS boards, the hospital bylaws, and the medi-
cal staff bylaws-had a contractual relationship with the Physicians that
was breached when the medical staff mishandled the reapplication of
Marlin and Gaskill's peer review. 37 The court of appeals concluded, how-
ever, that the medical staff bylaws did not in any way define or limit
MHS's power to act through its Board of Governors; therefore, "neither
the Medical Staff Bylaws, nor the Credentials Manual created pursuant to
those bylaws, g[a]ve rise to contractual rights. '38
31. Id.
32. Id. at 430-31.
33. Id. at 431-32 (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993))
(describing the elements a plaintiff must show to establish an attempted monopoly: (i) the
defendant engaged in predatory behavior, (ii) "a specific intent to monopolize," and (iii) a
"dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power").
34. See id. at 434-35.
35. Id. at 433.
36. See id. at 433-34 (citing Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436,
439 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied)).
37. See id. at 433.
38. Id. at 434 (explaining that the MHS board's authority and discretion to act on its




C. APPLICATION OF PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
The extent of the peer review privilege39 is periodically challenged,
both to gain access to information claimed to be privileged and to protect
communications between physicians related to peer review activities. In
re Higby was a mandamus proceeding challenging the right of a physician
to assert the peer review privilege with respect to communications made
to a professional association grievance committee. 40 Although the deci-
sion in In re Higby was not particularly surprising, Justice Keyes author-
ized an interesting concurring opinion that chastises the majority for not
addressing a "legal issue of first impression,"-whether the communica-
tions made to the professional association qualify for protection under
the Texas peer review privilege. 41
Dr. Higby and Dr. Halbridge acted as expert witnesses in the same
case, one for the defense and the other for the plaintiff. Believing that
Halbridge testified outside of his area of expertise and falsified state-
ments in his expert report, Higby filed an ethics complaint with the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). 42 Hal-
bridge then brought a defamation action against Higby, during which he
sought to discover Higby's testimony to the ACOG. Higby refused to
disclose his communications with ACOG, claiming they were part of a
privileged medical peer review communication. 43 The trial court granted
Halbridge's motion to compel Higby to answer, and Higby appealed.
44
The issue in this case was whether communications made to the ACOG
Grievance Committee were subject to the medical peer review privi-
lege.45 To prove his claim that the communications to the grievance com-
mittee were privileged, Higby had to show that the ACOG was a "health
care entity" as defined by section 151.002 of the Texas Occupations Code,
was operated under bylaws approved by the board, and was "authorized
to evaluate the quality of medical and health care services or the compe-
tence of physicians."'46 Higby's proof that the ACOG was a peer review
committee consisted of a copy of the ACOG's Code of Ethics and an
affidavit explaining why he spoke to the committee and asserting that as a
member of ACOG he had "a duty to report questionable behavior by
another physician" member.47 The Houston Fourteenth Court of Ap-
39. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 160.004-008 (West 2011) (generally protecting as
privileged and confidential oral and written communications, proceedings, and records of a
medical peer review committee).
40. In re Higby, 325 S.W.3d 740, 742 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
41. Id. at 744 (Keyes, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 748-52 (Keyes, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 741-42.
45. Id. at 742.
46. Id. (citing TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 151.002(a)(8), 151.001-165.160) (West 2004
& West Supp. 2009).
47. Id. at 743 (also noting that Higby referred to documents previously submitted as
exhibits to his motion for summary judgment, which was orally withdrawn at the hearing
on Higby's motion to compel).
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peals found this evidence insufficient to show that the ACOG Grievance
Committee was a medical peer review committee, and it ordered Higby
to disclose his committee testimony. 48
Justice Keyes agreed with the majority, but he provided an in-depth
discussion of why the peer review privilege established by Texas Occupa-
tions Code section 151.002 does not apply to the communications pro-
vided by Higby to the ACOG, thereby providing guidance for evaluation
of similar communications in the future.49 Key factors in Justice Keyes's
conclusion were that: (i) ACOG is not an organization authorized by
Texas Health and Safety Code section 161.0315(a) "to form a medical
peer review committee," (ii) the grievance committee was not "organ-
ized" 'to evaluate medical and health care services,"' (iii) "ACOG is not
a professional society organized ... for the purpose of evaluating a physi-
cian's provision of patient care," and (iv) Higby's grievance was not re-
lated to Halbridge's provision of care to a patient.50 Justice Keyes
arrived at this conclusion after reviewing the documentation provided by
the parties describing the purpose and functions of ACOG, as well as
other evidence in the record-none of which described the ACOG or its
grievance committee as a medical peer review committee. 51
III. SCOPE OF TEXAS MEDICAL LIABILITY ACT
The scope of claims eligible to fall under the scope of the Texas Medi-
cal Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, formerly Article 4590i of
the Revised Civil Statutes and now re-codified in chapter 74 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Medical Liability Act), is another
frequently litigated issue in Texas.52 The damage limits imposed by tort
reform are almost certainly a factor in plaintiffs' efforts to restyle what
may appear to be a health care liability claim into another cause of ac-
tion.53 This section of the Survey examines two cases in which Texas
courts have examined the scope of the Medical Liability Act. The first
case looks at a premises claim and the second attempts to reframe a
health care liability claim as a breach of contract.
48. Id. at 743-44 (citing Memorial Hosp. -The Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 11
(Tex. 1996) in which proof that a committee qualified as a medical peer review committee
included affidavits of medical staff coordinators providing evidence of "the structures of
hospital credentialing committees ... including the bylaws under which such committees
had been formed," was sufficient to show the committee in question was a peer review
committee).
49. Id. at 748-52. (Keyes, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 751-52.
51. Id. at 748-51.
52. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West 2011) (recodifying
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 4590i, § 1.03 and defining "[h]ealth care liability claim" as "a
cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment,
or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or
safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which prox-
imately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant's claim or cause of
action sounds in tort or contract").
53. Id. § 74.301 (setting a limit of $250,000 on noneconomic damages).
[Vol. 64
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A. PREMISES V. HEALTH CARE LIABILITY CLAIMS
Distinguishing between health care liability claims and premises liabil-
ity or other tort claims can be complex in cases involving health care facil-
ities because the Medical Liability Act describes health care liability
claims as those resulting from acts or omissions that fall outside of the
standard of care for medical treatment and those that fall outside the
standard of care related to "safety."'54 However, the Medical Liability
Act does not define what constitutes a departure from the standard of
care for safety, which leaves it to the courts to determine what differenti-
ates a premises claim from a health care liability claim when patients'
injuries are, at least in part, caused by a health care facility's premises,
equipment, or furniture. 55
In Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, a case the Texas Supreme
Court analyzed twice, the supreme court first properly decided that inju-
ries resulting from the failure of the footboard of a patient's bed should
not be brought as a health care liability claim because the bed was not
integral to the hospital's delivery of health care.5 6 In its second look at
the case, the supreme court changed its position and decided that the
footboard was integral to the delivery of health care.5 7 The supreme
court offered little explanation for this turnaround and limited the cir-
cumstances under which patient injuries sustained in health care facilities
can be brought as premises claims.5 8
Prior to Marks, the court adopted a rule to help distinguish medical
liability claims from other types of claims.59 In Diversicare General Part-
ner, Inc. v. Rubio, the supreme court categorized what appear to be non-
medical services nursing homes furnish to residents-such as supervision
of daily activities, routine examinations, administration of medications,
and "meeting the fundamental care needs of the residents"-as falling
squarely within the scope of the Medical Liability Act, and the supreme
court described medical liability claims as those in which the negligent act
or omission is "an inseparable part of the rendition of medical services." '60
In Marks, the supreme court extended the Diversicare rule to the safety
aspect of the Medical Liability Act and agreed with the hospital's position
that the bed itself was an "inextricable part" of Marks's care and
treatment. 61
The facts of the case were relatively simple; while in the hospital, pa-
tient Marks was injured when the bed frame he was leaning on collapsed.
54. Id. § 74.001(a)(13).
55. See id. § 74.001.
56. Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 677, 685-86 (Tex. 2010) (ap-
pendix containing the supreme court's previous decision, No. 07-0783).
57. Id. at 666.
58. Id. at 664.
59. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 844-45 (Tex. 2005) (ana-
lyzing a claim arising from injuries to a patient during a "sexual assault by another patient"
under the theory of negligent supervision).
60. Id. at 849.
61. Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 662, 666.
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Marks alleged, in relevant part, that the hospital's negligence in failing to
provide him with a safe environment and in failing to properly assemble
and maintain his bed contributed to his injuries.62 The trial court found
that these claims constituted a health care liability claim and required
substantiation by an expert's report, which was not timely filed. The
court of appeals concluded that Mark's claims were related to premises
liability, not health care liability.63 On remand from the supreme court,
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal for failure to
timely file an expert's report, and the supreme court subsequently
granted a rehearing.
In deciding Marks, the supreme court relied heavily on its previous de-
cision in Diversicare and on its analysis of the Texas Legislature's intent
with respect to what constitutes a departure from accepted safety stan-
dards, which it reviewed de novo.64 In its review of legislative intent, the
supreme court stated that the "Legislature ... could not have intended
that standards of safety encompass all negligent injuries to patients" and
applied the Diversicare test to safety standards: the Medical Liability Act
applies to injuries when "the unsafe condition or thing, causing injury to
the patient, is an inseparable or integral part of the patient's care or
treatment."
65
The supreme court categorized Marks's bed as a piece of medical
equipment that was specific to his care-"an integral and inseparable"
part of his care. As a result, the supreme court ruled that Marks's claim
was a health care liability claim and subject to the requirements and limi-
tations of the Medical Liability Act.66 Marks's failure to timely submit an
expert report properly resulted in dismissal of his claim.67
This decision contravened the supreme court's first review of Marks in
2008, when it concluded that the assembly and maintenance of the bed
did not involve the exercise of professional or medical judgment and was
merely "incidental" to Marks's care and treatment. 68 In a concurring and
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Gree, Guzman, and Lehrmann, Jus-
tice Jefferson took the position that a footboard on a patient's bed is no
more inseparable from his care and treatment than the hospital's stairs,
walls, and utilities.69 He also pointed out that the supreme court took
great pains in its first review of Marks to explain "why the footboard [of
the bed] was not integral to St. Luke's delivery of health care services
"70
62. Id. at 660.
63. Id. at 661.
64. Id. at 662-64.
65. Id. at 664.
66. Id. at 666.
67. Id. at 664-66.
68. Id. at 682-83 (appendix containing supreme court's previous decision, No. 07-
0783).
69. Id. at 675 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
70. Id. (referring to the supreme court's prior decision, No. 07-0783, where the court
concluded that Marks's hospital bed claim related to the failure of a piece of equipment
[Vol. 64
Health Care Law
The supreme court's reversal in its categorization of the bed or foot-
board as equipment that was integral to Marks's care and treatment may
be partly explained by its categorization of the bed as medical equipment.
Hospital beds are classified as durable medical equipment by payors such
as the Medicare program, and beds with special characteristics may be
ordered by a patient's physician to meet the patient's specific medical
needs. 71 In its first review of Marks, the supreme court provided an ex-
ample of when a hospital bed might require professional judgment, such
as when "a health care provider might determine that a patient's condi-
tion called for restraints and that side rails attached to the bed would
suffice." '72
If the bed in Marks had been ordered specifically for Marks to assist in
his recovery and treatment, the supreme court's conclusion that the bed
was integral to his care and treatment would have been more understand-
able. However, the Texas Supreme Court never referred to any special
characteristics of the bed that were necessary for Marks's individual med-
ical needs or to a health care provider's order for a specific type of bed.73
The plurality's failure to explain the change in its categorization of the
bed from incidental to Marks's care in 2008, to integral to his care and
treatment in 2010, suggests that we may continue to see disputes over
premises versus health care liability claims to address injuries sustained
by patients in health care facilities.
B. BREACH OF CONTRACT V. HEALTH CARE LIABILITY CLAIMS
Ramchandani v. Jimenez takes a different approach in trying to avoid
the caps on damages for malpractice claims.74 Patient Jimenez claimed
that he and Dr. Ramchandani had a verbal agreement that only Ram-
chandani would perform his surgery, but Ramchandani breached that
agreement when he permitted one of his associates to perform the proce-
dure.75 Jimenez asserted that but for this decision he would not have
suffered his injuries. However, rather than bringing his claim against
Ramchandani and his associate as a health care liability claim under the
Medical Liability Act, Jimenez brought the claim as a breach of contract
and fraud claim.76 The trial court dismissed the majority of Jimenez's
and that the assembly and maintenance of the bed were tasks that did not require any
specialized health care knowledge and evaluation of whether they were performed negli-
gently, so expert testimony of a medical person would not be required).
71. See MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY MANUAL ch. 15, § 110.1 (2011), available at https:/
/www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/bpl02cl5.pdf (establishing the definition of equipment
classified by Medicare as durable medical equipment or medical equipment and stating
that such equipment is generally covered by Medicare if the use is medically necessary for
the specific patient's medical needs).
72. Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 682 (Appendix containing supreme court's previous decision,
No. 07-0783).
73. See id. at 682-83.
74. Ramchandani v. Jimenez, 314 S.W.3d 148, 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2010, no pet.).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 149-50.
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claims for failure to file an expert witness report and denied Ram-
chandani's request for attorney's fees.77
Jimenez's injuries were unquestionably the result of his surgical proce-
dure, and the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that reframing a health care liability claim as a breach of contract
case was not permissible to avoid the need to file an expert's report.78
The court of appeals considered whether Jimenez's claims qualified as
health care liability claims and whether Ramchandani was entitled to at-
torney's fees in accordance with chapter 74. The court of appeals con-
cluded that the acts and omissions of Ramchandani and his associate
were "an inseparable part of the rendition of health care services,"
thereby making Jimenez's claims health care liability claims.79 In a foot-
note, however, the court of appeals left open the possibility that a breach
of contract claim against a health care provider could stand alone and not
be considered a health care liability claim, but it did not elaborate on the
circumstance that might permit such a claim.8 0
The basis for Jimenez's breach of contract claim was that he had only
consented to Ramchandani's performance of the surgery, which meant
that Ramchandani's associate performed the procedure without
Jimenez's consent. The Texas Supreme Court previously addressed the
question of breach of contract and battery claims against a physician in
Murphy v. Russell, in which the supreme court stated that "failure to ob-
tain consent does not automatically result in liability" because a practi-
tioner may have reasons to provide care without specific consent that do
not breach any applicable standard of care. 81 Murphy was similar to
Ramchandani in that the plaintiffs in both cases failed to file an expert's
report with their pleadings. In Murphy, the supreme court did not permit
Russell to avoid the expert report requirements of the Medical Practice
Act "by filing a bare-bones pleading that assert[ed] battery based on lack
of consent. 82 Thus, Jimenez's decision to file his claim as a breach of
contract rather than a health care liability claim presumably was, in part,
a decision related to the requirement under the Medical Liability Act for
an expert report. Nonetheless, this case follows the supreme court's deci-
sion in Murphy that a plaintiff cannot avoid the Medical Liability Act's
expert report requirement by reframing a health care liability claim as a
breach of contract claim.
77. Id. at 151.
78. Id. at 150-51.
79. Id. at 152-53 (citing the court of appeal's finding that an anesthesiologist's breach
of contract and battery resulting in injuries to a patient where in fact health care liability
claims).
80. See id. at 153 n.3.




IV. OTHER ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE LIABILITY CLAIMS
A. STATUS OF REPOSE
In Methodist Health System of San Antonio v. Rankin, the Texas Su-
preme Court decided that the ten-year statute of repose for medical neg-
ligence claims did not violate the Texas Constitution's open courts
provision.83 The open courts provision of the Texas Constitution pro-
vides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done
him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law. '"84 Section 74.251(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code provides that a health care liability claim must be "not later
than 10 years after the date of the act or omission that gives rise to the
claim."' 85 Importantly, this section "is intended as a statute of repose so
that all claims must be brought within 10 years or they are time barred. 86
In Rankin, the patient learned in July 2006 that a surgical sponge was left
inside her during a November 1995 hysterectomy.8 7 She sued the hospital
where the operation was performed and submitted evidence that she did
not know of the sponge and could not have reasonably discovered it.88
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
finding that chapter 74's statute of repose barred the claim.89 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held
that section 74.251(b) was unconstitutional because it restricted the pa-
tient's right to sue before she had a reasonable opportunity to discover
the wrong.90
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision that sec-
tion 74.251(b) contravened the open courts provision of the Texas Consti-
tution because the statute was a "reasonable exercise of the Legislature's
police power to provide a certain cutoff to claims after an ample period of
ten years, ... 91 In making this decision, the supreme court recognized
that a "few plaintiffs," like the patient who did not discover the retained
sponge for eleven years, will be blocked from bringing claims through no
fault of their own.92 However, the supreme court found chapter 74's stat-
ute of repose evinced the legislature's fundamental policy choice that the
collective benefits of a definitive cutoff for health care liability claims-
the length of time insureds are exposed to potential liability negatively
affects insurance rates-were more important than a particular plaintiff's
83. 307 S.W.3d 283, 292 (Tex. 2010).
84. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
85. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.251(b) (West 2011).
86. Id.
87. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d at 285.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 290.
91. Id. at 285-86, 290 (relying on the test formulated in Lebohm v. City of Galveston,
275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tex. 1995) for whether legislative action violates the open courts
provision of the Texas Constitution).
92. Id. at 288.
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right to sue a decade after the alleged malpractice. 93
In rejecting the lower court's rationale, the supreme court noted the
important distinctions between statutes of repose and limitations. A stat-
ute of repose abrogates the discovery rule and similar exceptions to a
statute of limitations.94 In other words, if a statute of repose was subject
to a plaintiff's inability to discover her injury, then it would be indistin-
guishable from a statute of limitations.95 Additionally, the supreme court
clarified its previous holding in Robinson v. Weaver, which dealt with the
issue of whether a medical negligence claim based on an alleged misdiag-
nosis not discovered for more than two years tolled the two-year statute
of limitations.96 In deciding that a misdiagnosis claim does not trigger the
discovery rule in medical negligence cases, the supreme court in Robin-
son noted that claims premised on an alleged misdiagnosis are fundamen-
tally different than those premised on a retained foreign object. 97
Namely, the latter deserve the protection afforded by the discovery rule
because the lapse of time entails neither the danger of a false or frivolous
claim nor the danger of a speculative or uncertain claim.98 In Rankin v.
Methodist Healthcare System of San Antonio, Ltd., the San Antonio
Court of Appeals relied upon language in Robinson to decide that section
74.251(b) was unconstitutional. 99 However, the Texas Supreme Court
noted that Robinson (a) dealt with a statute of limitation rather than re-
pose, (b) did not involve a constitutional challenge, and (c) was relied
upon in a subsequent case that analyzed a statute of repose under due
process considerations.100
B. ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR FAILURE TO SERVE AN EXPERT REPORT
In Garcia v. Gomez, the Texas Supreme Court considered the scope of
testimony required under chapter 74 to support an award of attorney's
fees for a plaintiff's failure to serve an expert report.101 For a health care
liability claim, section 74.351(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code provides for an award of "reasonable attorney's fees and costs of
court incurred by the physician or health care provider" when an expert
report is not timely served.' 02 In Garcia, the daughter of a patient who
died from a pulmonary embolism following surgery sued the treating phy-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 290.
95. Id.
96. 550 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. 1977).
97. Id. at 21.
98. Id. at 20-21 (citing Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277, 285 (1961)).
99. Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio, Ltd. v. Rankin, 261 S.W.3d 93, 103
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008), rev'd, 307 S.W.3d 283, 292 (Tex. 2010).
100. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d at 291 (referring to Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants,
Inc.-Texas, 889 S.W.2d 259, 259 (Tex. 1994), which upheld the constitutionality of a statute
of repose and discussed the foreign object and misdiagnosis distinction in Robinson, 550
S.W.2d at 20).
101. 319 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tex. 2010).
102. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b) (West 2011).
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sician.10 3 The daughter claimed that the physician breached the standard
of care by failing to install a blood filter as a preventive measure.10 4 Prior
to filing suit, the daughter obtained from the physician medical records
that indicated the alleged breach.105 However, post-filing, the daughter
obtained from a codefendant additional records that revealed a filter was
placed in her mother's chest cavity during an earlier procedure.10 6 Be-
cause of this new information, the daughter filed no expert reports, and
the physician moved to dismiss.107
The physician also moved for attorney's fees under section 74.351(b).
The plaintiff opposed the fees on the basis that the physician brought the
suit on himself for failing to produce medical records showing the exis-
tence of the filter.10 8 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss but
denied the request for attorney's fees. The physician appealed the deci-
sion, and the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
ruling because the attorney's testimony was conclusory and failed to es-
tablish that his fees were actually "incurred.' 0 9 In the trial court, the
attorney testified that he had been "doing medical-malpractice law/litiga-
tion" since 1984 and that the reasonable and necessary attorney's fees for
handling a "case like this" are $12,200.00.110 The attorney did not testify
about his hourly rate, the identity of any other attorneys who worked on
the case, or specific details about the work that was done. Nevertheless,
the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions denying
fees because "there was some evidence of these fees." '
The supreme court acknowledged that the physician's attorney failed to
establish what fees were incurred, which was also required by the statute;
however, such a failure did not preclude an award of fees." 2 In other
words, even though the attorney's testimony was conclusory, this testi-
mony satisfied the "reasonable" portion of section 74.351(b), which was
enough to warrant fees. The supreme court essentially decided that the
"incurred" part of section 74.351(b) could be inferred from the circum-
stances because "it blinks reality to assume that the attorney was a volun-
teer or that [the physician] did not incur attorney's fees for this work." 113
Interestingly, in making this observation, the supreme court opined that
an attorney's testimony about the reasonableness of his or her fees is un-
like other expert testimony.' 14 It is not objectionable as conclusory be-
cause the opposing party, or the party's attorney, has knowledge of the





108. Id. at 640-41.
109. Garcia v. Gomez, 286 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008), rev'd on
other grounds, 319 S.W.3d 638, 643-44 (Tex. 2010).
110. Garcia, 319 S.W.3d at 641.
111. Id. at 643.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 642.
114. Id. at 641.
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time and effort involved. 115 Accordingly, the opposing party may, and
now should, question the attorney regarding the reasonableness of his
fee, which the plaintiff's attorney in this instance failed to do.1 16
Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice Johnson dissented from the major-
ity's opinion because they believed that section 74.351(b) required evi-
dence of fees incurred. 117 Specifically, "[t]estimony that a fee is
reasonable, without saying it was ever charged, is useless."' 18 Justice
Johnson also filed a separate dissent arguing that the majority's distinc-
tion of an attorney's testimony about his fees from other expert testimony
was contrary to precedent.' 19 In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip-
ment Corp., the Texas Supreme Court established the factors to be con-
sidered when attorney's fees are at issue.120 Justice Johnson opined that
the physician's attorney did not come close to establishing many of these
factors, and his testimony consisted of nothing other than a prohibited
ipse dixit by a credentialed witness.' 21 Finally, Justice Johnson noted that
the majority's holding would "require [a party opposing attorney's fees]
to cross-examine an opposing party's expert and assist in proving up a
case against himself or herself on pain of converting conclusory, legally
insufficient evidence into legally sufficient evidence.' 22
V. TEXAS PROVIDERS CHALLENGING FEDERAL LAWS
A. IMPOSITION OF CMP FOR VIOLATIONS OF CONDITIONS
OF PARTICIPATION
Texas facility licensing standards often mirror the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) conditions of participation (CoP), and
Texas licensing agencies frequently work together with CMS to monitor
compliance with these standards and rules.123 These federal and state
agencies primarily enforce these rules and regulations by requiring facili-
ties that are out of compliance to complete a plan of correction and to
bring the facility back into compliance in a reasonable period of time.
Failure to do so could result in fines and, in the worst cases, loss of licen-
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 644 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 645.
119. Id. at 648.
120. 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997) (establishing factors such as the time and labor
required, the forfeiture of other employment, the locale's customary fee, and the results
obtained).
121. Garcia, 319 S.W.3d at 648 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing Burrow v. Arce, 997
S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. 1999) for the proposition that "a claim will not stand or fall on the
mere ipse dixit of a credentialed witness.").
122. Id. at 649.
123. Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment of H-2B Aliens in the United States, 76
Fed. Reg. 15,130, 15,159-15,160 (Mar. 18, 2011) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655; 29




sure or Medicare participation.1 24 The federal government also has avail-
able the federal Civil Monetary Penalties Law to penalize institutional
providers financially for violations of the CoP.125
Cedar Lake Nursing Home v. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services is an example of this type of enforcement action.12 6 Cedar Lake
is a nursing facility and a Medicare provider. In 2008, an elderly resident
of the facility left without anyone noticing and was discovered wandering
alone down a highway. The facility alarms failed to alert the operators to
the resident's departure.127 Upon investigation of the incident, CMS sur-
veyors determined that the facility was in violation of a number of the
CoP, including those requiring the facility to maintain an environment
free of hazards and to adequately supervise its residents. In addition to
requiring the facility correct the deficiencies, CMS imposed a financial
penalty of $5,000 per incident on the facility under the Civil Monetary
Penalties Law.128
Cedar Lake appealed CMS's decision to the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ), who rejected Cedar Lake's argument that the failure of the alarm
was unforeseeable because the alarm contractor had failed to inform
Cedar Hill that he disconnected the alarm. The ALJ upheld the CMP
fine. The basis for Cedar Lake's appeal to the Fifth Circuit was that the
ALJ made its decision on a motion for summary judgment, not an eviden-
tiary hearing.129 Cedar Hill requested that the matter be reviewed de
novo.
130
The Fifth Circuit refused to review the case de novo and upheld the
ALJ's decision based on a previous finding that "[t]he absence of an evi-
dentiary hearing does not alter the standard of judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions .. .because agencies have particular subject-matter
experience and expertise .... ",131 The Fifth Circuit also held that Cedar
Lake's failure to maintain adequate safeguards that prevented residents
from wandering outside of the facility unattended and its failure to ade-
quately supervise residents known to be at risk for such wandering were,
without question, violations of the CoP.132
This case is interesting because the infraction, although potentially dan-
gerous for the residents, did not result in harm to the patient who had
wandered away from the facility. This is the type of infraction frequently
124. See Civil Money Penalties, Assessments, and Exclusions, 42 C.F.R. pt. 402.1(e)
(2011) (establishing the right to exclude providers from participation in the Medicare
program).
125. Id. at pt. 402.1(c) (also setting forth the circumstances under which CMP may be
imposed on providers).
126. 619 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 2010).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 455-56.
130. Id. at 456.
131. Id. at 457 (citing Fal-Meridian, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 604




addressed by requiring the facility to submit a plan of correction to the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), with monitoring by
DHHS until such time as it is confident that the circumstances resulting
in the infraction have been corrected. Imposition of fines and penalties
under the CMP and exclusion of the provider from participation in the
Medicare program are enforcement tools that have historically been used
when a provider fails to correct an identified deficiency, multiple defi-
ciencies, or a deficiency that poses a serious risk of harm to the residents.
It is possible that the facility had many more deficiencies that were not
noted in this case, thereby raising the risk of harm to the residents.
The March 18, 2011 edition of the Federal Register published an update
to the process for imposition of CMP on nursing facilities mandated by
PPACA.133 The government's purpose in revising the rules is, in part, to
eliminate a nursing facility's ability to defer the financial impact of a
CMP penalty through the appeals process.' 34 Requiring the facility to
deposit the CMP amount while appealing the government's decision
achieves this aim.' 35
B. CHALLENGE TO HOSPICE CAP
Lion Health Services, Inc. v. Sebelius presents a somewhat rare exam-
ple of a provider that successfully challenged the validity of a federal
law. 136 Like all hospice providers, Lion Health was subject to a "cap" on
its reimbursement from Medicare. 137 After its fiscal intermediary deter-
mined that payments received for 2006 and 2007 had exceeded the cap
and demanded a refund, Lion Health filed an appeal before the Provider
Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) in accordance with the adminis-
trative appeals process. 138 Lion Health argued that the intermediary's
determination was invalid because the regulation used to calculate the
cap was in conflict with the statute, and thereby invalid.139 After the
PRRB denied Lion Health's appeal, the hospice care provider filed an
appeal with the district court.
The district court used the two-step Chevron analysis to determine if
the regulation Lion Health challenged was invalid; this analysis required
it to ask whether, when enacting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(i)(2)(C), Congress
directly addressed the question asked in 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1), which
is "how the 'number of [Miedicare beneficiaries' in a hospice program in
an accounting year should be calculated."14 0  In finding that
133. Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment of H-2B Aliens in the United States, 76
Fed. Reg. 15,130, 15,158 (Mar. 18, 2011) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655; 29 C.F.R. pt.
503).
134. Id. at 15,159-15,160.
135. Id.
136. Lion Health Servs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 689 F. Supp. 2d 849, 858 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
137. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(i) (West 2011); see 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 (2011).
138. Lion Health Servs., 689 F. Supp. 2d at 851-52.
139. Id. (the method of calculating the cap is very lengthy and as such, is not included).




§ 1395f(i)(2)(C) clearly specified how the Medicare beneficiaries should
be counted when calculating the cap, the district court was required to
give deference to the statutory description when comparing it to the sec-
tion 418.309(b)(1) description. Determining that the methodology for
calculating the cap was distinctly different in section 418.309(b)(1), the
district court ruled that the implementing regulation was unlawful and
that the DHHS was enjoined from enforcing the overpayment determina-
tion against Lion Health.141
Not surprisingly, DHHS appealed this decision, arguing in part that the
regulation did not create an injury for purposes of determining standing.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision that the
regulation was unlawful and must be set aside.14 2 The Fifth Circuit
agreed that Lion Health had standing to bring the challenge that the reg-
ulation contradicted Congress's intent as expressed in the statute, but it
determined that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to
remand the recalculation of the amount owed under § 1395f(i)(2) to
DHHS. 14 3
C. CHALLENGE TO PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT OF 2010
This Texas Survey of health care law would not be complete without at
least mentioning that Greg Abbott, the Attorney General of the State of
Texas, joined thirteen other Attorneys General in challenging the consti-
tutionality of PPACA. 1 44 The case has already made it through a district
court in Florida and is expected to be heard by the Supreme Court. The
Attorneys General assert that PPACA violates the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution by mandating that all citizens and legal residents of the
United States have qualifying healthcare coverage. As mentioned in the
introduction, PPACA may potentially have an enormous impact on the
country's health care system, so the outcome of this case is eagerly
anticipated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases in this year's Texas Survey have no common theme, but they
each address areas of law that are frequently litigated in Texas. Common
disputes include those related to business arrangements, restrictions on
physicians' ability to practice medicine, and claims for redress under the
Medical Liability Act. These issues are likely to continue as Texas prov-
iders attempt to adapt their practices and business arrangements to new
methodologies for payment, increased competition, and new regulations,
such as those contained in PPACA. Health care providers and the attor-
141. Id. at 858.
142. Lion Health Servs., Inc., v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 2011).
143. Id. at 704.
144. Complaint at 4, State v. U.S. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., case 3:10-cv-0091-
RV-EMT (N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010).
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neys who represent them will continue to face challenges as they attempt
to adapt to the new business and regulatory health care environment.
